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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREBDoM OF AssEMBLY-EQuAL PROTECTION oF
LAw-The ordinance here involved prohibited any person from addressing
a political or religious meeting in any public park. At a meeting involving no
disturbances or breaches of the peace, plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, was
arrested when he addressed a meeting in a public park. The state supreme court
upheld a conviction under the ordinance.1 Held, reversed. The principal case is
on all fours with Niemotko -v. Maryland.2 The state conceded at oral argument
that the meeting was a religious one and that the ordinance as construed and
applied did not prohibit church services in the park. Therefore, since Catholics
and Protestants could hold their services there, it would be treating the religious
services of the Jehovah's Witnesses differently if they were denied use of the
park. The Niemotko case decided that such discrimination was barred by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Fowler -v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73
S.Ct. 526 (1953).
No better case than the principal one could be cited in support of Justice
Jackson's admonition against the view that the brief oral argument before the
Supreme Court is but "a vestigial formality with little effect on the result."3
In both reported state court opinions and in the briefs submitted by the parties
in the principal case, very little attention was devoted to the equal protection
question; instead almost exclusive concern was had with whether Davis -v.
Massachusetts! should be overruled. In that case the Court sustained an
ordinance of Boston very much like the one here considered.5 In avoiding this
seemingly central issue the Court indicates that unlike the Niemotko case, which
was considered decisive, the result here turns almost exclusively, if not entirely,
upon the "usual last resort of constitutional arguments"6-the equal protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment and not upon the deprivation of First Amendment
freedoms. 7 Although the Court has once again successfully avoided expressly
overruling the Davis holding, the principal case follows the trend of previous
decisions which have substantially diminished its value as a precedent.8 In a
number of cases, many of them resulting from the actions of Jehovah's Witnesses,
THE

1 State v. Fowler, (R.I. 1951) 83 A. (2d) 67; State v. Fowler, (R.I. 1952) 91 A.
(2d) 27.
.
2 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951).
3 Jackson, "Advocacy Before the Supreme Court," 37 A.B.A.J. 801 (1951).
4Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731 (1897).
5 Massachusetts has itself invalidated an ordinance like the one it and the Supreme
Court had sustained in the Davis case. Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, 321 Mass. 335, 73
N.E. (2d) 241 (1947).
6 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 at 208, 47 S.Ct. 584 (1927).
7 Frankfurter concurred separately to indicate agreement with the majority opinion
"except insofar as it may derive support from the First Amendment." Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 at 70, 73 S.Ct. 526 (1953).
s Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939); Schneider v. Irvington, 308
U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669 (1943);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948); Niemotko v. Maryland, note 2
supra; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951).
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the Court has indicated9 that all prior restraints of the fundamental,10
cognate11 freedoms of speech and religion will be examined most carefully.12 This remains true despite the presumption usual in other areas13 that
the statute comes before the Court "encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation."14 Thus a license or permit which must be secured, or a tax
which must be paid, or a usual "practice" which must be complied with, prior
to exercising the freedom,15 is almost certain to be unconstitutional unless there
are clear, non-arbitrary, and reasonable criteria for fixing the tax or determining
whether the license should issue. 16 Equally obnoxious as a discriminatory prior
license or tax are blanket prohibitions which prevent any exercise by any one
of a basic freedom, as when a statute as construed and applied prohibits the
distribution of all leaflets or books,17 or prevents any house-to-house canvassing
for religious purposes.18 These decisions invalidating blanket prior restraints
on First Amendment freedoms when exercised in the public streets, as well
as the language of some members of the Court,19 indicate that it is unlikely that
there is a valid distinction between public streets and public parks20 as regards
ordinances exerting prohibitions on fundamental freedoms. Such considerations
suggest that when the Court is compelled to re-examine the Davis case, it is
likely to lose its remaining vestige of vitality.
9 Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717 (1944). On prior restraints
generally, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
10 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178
(1943).
11 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 at 364, 57 S.Ct. 255 (1937).
12 Even where subsequent punishment is imposed for having exercised a basic freedom,
the record is likely to be examined most cautiously. For example, in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949), the majority rested their opinion on a hitherto
unnoticed sentence in the record.
13 Although recent cases, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857
(1951), suggest that the Court has not accepted his view, Justice Stone indicated that as
regards the basic freedoms there may even be a presumption of invalidity to any statute
seeking to abridge them. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58
S.Ct. 778 (1938); Dowling, "The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases,"
41 CoL. L. REv. 1160 at 1175 (1941). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct.
448 (1949).
14 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 261, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941).
15 A license: Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938); a permit:
Schneider v. Irvington, note 8 supra; a tax: Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63
S.Ct. 870 (1943); a prior practice: Niemotko v. Maryland, note 2 supra.
16Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
17 Religious leaHets: Jamison v. Texas, note 8 supra; informational leaHets: Snyder v.
Milwaukee, 308 U.S. 147 at 155, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939). The distribution of primarily
commercial leaHets may be prohibited. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct.
920 (1942).
18 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943); however, the vitality of
this holding is made questionable by Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct.
920 (1951), where an ordinance prohibiting all house to house canvassing was sustained
by a six to three decision.
19 See, e.g., Roberts, J., speaking also for Black, J., in Hague v. C.I.O., note 8 supra.
20 Such a distinction is attempted in People v. Nahman, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 29 (1947).
But compare Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, note 5 supra; also note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1234
(1947).
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A question of interest is presented by the broad language used in announcing
the Court's opinion in the principal case. It is there said by Justice Douglas that
"it is no business of courts to say that what is religious practice or activity for
one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment..•. To
call the words which one minister speaks to his congregation a sermon, immune
from regulation, and the words of another minister an address, subject to regulation, is merely an indirect way of preferring one religion over another.'121 It
is believed that such language solves none of the very delicate problems here
involved, but rather attests to the veracity of the observation that "Generalizations are treacherous in the application of large constitutional concepts.''22 If
the talk delivered after prayers was to urge violence and the overthrow of
government by force, would we still say it was a sermon delivered by a minister
to his congregation? It is clear that merely labeling an activity as religious does
not make it immune from regulation. The legislature and courts have regulated23
certain "religious" activities when they were found to be dangerous, commercial,
interfering with activities reserved to licensed professionals, fraudulent, or contrary to the health or welfare of the children subject to the activity.24 The
legitimacy of such regulation compels acceptance of one horn of a dilemma:
either we must say that those activities which may be regulated are not religious,
or we must admit that it is not unconstitutional to prefer certain religious
activities over others. If we accept the former, then the language quoted above
begs the question, for we must first decide what is religious activity. If we
accept the latter then we admit counter examples to the general propositions
relied upon by the Court. It is believed that neither history nor precedent compels acceptance of the broad language used by the Court in the above quoted
passage.

S. I. Shuman

21 Principal case at 70.
22 Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 at 469, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
23 See generally, Lake, "Freedom to Worship Curiously," 1 FLA. L. RBv. 203 (1948).
24Dangerous snake handling: State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E. (2d) 179
(1949), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 813
(1949); see note in 2 VAND. L. RBv. 694 (1949); fortune telling: Dill v. Hamilton, 137
Neb. 723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940); giving medications: State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8
P. (2d) 1083 (1932); involving fraud: New v. United States, (9th Cir. 1917) 245 F. 710,
cert. den. 246 U.S. 665, 38 S.Ct. 334 (1918); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 64 S.Ct. 882 (1944); child labor: Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438
(1944).

